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RECENT BOOKS 
THE SUPREME CouRT: PALLADIUM: OF FREEDOM. By Alpheus T. Mason. 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1962. Pp. 207. ,$4.95. 
What is the true view of the Supreme Court and its role in the American 
system of government? In taking upon itself the ultimate power to decide 
controversies regarding the meaning and application of the Constitution 
as the fundamental law, has it acted as usurper or grantee? Is it essentially 
an instrument of democracy and popular self-government or of oligarchy and 
minority rule? As expounder and enforcer of the great principle of limited 
government under law, is it the Vehicle of Revealed Truth, the Nation's 
Conscience, our Palladium of Freedo~, Democracy's Indispensable Crutch, 
or merely one of a number of Power Groups in a wonderfully contrived 
system of checks and balances? 
These and other related questions make up the subject under inquiry 
in this notable study by Professor Mason,1 one of the nation's outstanding 
authorities on the Supreme Court and its works.2 The book is an expan-
sion of the William W. Cook Lectures delivered in the Spring of 1962 at 
The University of Michigan. As may be inferred from the title, the central 
thesis is a defense and justification of the institution of judicial review. 
The summarizing conclusion (p. 178) is: 
"By protecting the integrity and unimpeded operation of the 
entire process by which majorities are formed, judicial review becomes 
a surrogate for revolution and contributes positively to the preservation 
of democracy .... 
"The Court is the palladium of free government. Its decisions, 
based on reason and authority, have a moral force far exceeding that 
of the purse or sword .... The Justices inform by both precept and 
example. They make vocal and audible the ideals and values that 
might otherwise be silenced. Far from discouraging civic responsibility, 
judicial decisions and Supreme Court opinions are among the greatest 
educational forces in America. In passing judgment on living issues, 
in resolving complexities which are at any given moment puzzling 
and dividing us, it teaches the demanding lesson of free government." 
Before he arrives at this conclusion, Professor Mason ranges over a 
wide sweep of American political experience. In his introductory chapter, 
entitled "Political System Without a Model," he surveys the formation of 
1 McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University. 
2 Some of Professor Mason's other books on the Supreme Court are: BRANDEIS, A 
FREE MAN'S LIFE (1946); THE SUPREME COURT: VEHICLE OF REVEALED TRUTH OR POWER 
GROUP 1930-1937 (1953); AMERICAN CoNSI'ITUTIONAL LAw, INTRODUCTORY EssAYS AND 
SELECTED CASES (1954) [co-author with Beaney]; SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM: AMERICAN 
PoLmCAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (1955); HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956); 
THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN (1958); THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE 
SocIETY (1959) [co-author with Beaney]. 
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the Constitution. He views the Constitution as a logical culmination of one 
continuous revolutionary movement which began with the enunciation of 
a philosophy of government new to the world in the Declaration of In-
dependence. Adoption of the Constitution amounted to a peaceful revolu-
tion directed toward an alteration of a loose confederation of states into 
an organic whole, founded upon the idea of popular government held in 
restraint under a built-in system of checks upon majority rule. Inclusion 
of a feasible amending procedure, coupled with a Bill of Rights subse-
quently added to insure more specifically toleration of dissent and expres-
sion of minority views, provided mechanisms by which further peaceful 
changes might be effected as circumstance warranted. In the eyes of the 
founding fathers, these arrangements would preclude, so far as it was 
humanly possible to do so, the need to resort to violent revolution as a 
method of change in the future. 
In his third chapter, entitled "Cementing the Keystone," Professor 
Mason reviews the events leading up to establishment of judicial review as 
a part of the constitutional plan. His well-documented, carefully-reasoned 
conclusion is that judicial review was not only intended and expected by 
the framers to become an element in the plan of government, but that it 
was a logical, essential feature of the system. Two chapters follow in which 
he analyzes two periods of history during which, in the view of its critics-
Jefferson during the era of the Marshall Court and F. D. Roosevelt during 
the regime of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes-judicial review was allegedly 
perverted into judicial supremacy. The final chapter examines the func-
tioning of the Court in the area of its greatest concern since 1937, the 
maintenance of civil liberties and equality of treatment under the law. 
One can not fail to be impressed by the profound erudition, felicity 
of style, and penetrating insight displayed by the author. His discourse 
is an intellectual feast fully measuring up in quality to the kind his pre-
vious writings in this area of scholarly inquiry have taught his readers to 
expect. As one who is generally in accord with his conclusions and evalua-
tions as a whole, this reviewer finds it somewhat difficult to point to any 
matters upon which to take issue. Yet there is one point regarding which, 
in the reviewer's judgment, the author betrays a certain cloudiness of 
view. His is a point of view which characterizes the writings of a great 
many commentators of "liberal" outlook on the work of the Supreme 
Court in recent years, some of whom were extremely critical of the opera-
tion of the system of judicial review before the "Constitutional Revolution" 
of the 1930's. Introducing the second half of his discourse, the author raises 
the question, "Can a line of demarcation be maintained between judicial 
review and judicial supremacy?" (p. 91) This, he concedes, is "a problem 
of which its framers were acutely aware" and one which "is still troubling 
the Court and its critics more than a century and a half later." (p. 92) 
This, of course, is the central issue posed by the Supreme Court's having 
been accorded the role it has in the American scheme of government. The 
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author, it is evident from the structure of his discourse, appears to believe 
such a distinction can validly be drawn. In the judgment of this reviewer, 
the realistic answer that must be given to this question is "Nol" 
To refuse to make such a distinction does not necessarily imply on the 
one hand a condemnation of judicial review as a feature of the American 
system of government nor on the other an acceptance of every pronounce• 
ment of the Supreme Court as "revealed truth" concerning the meaning 
of the Constitution. To attempt to draw a valid distinction between a 
proper exercise of the judicial veto on constitutional grounds ("judicial 
review") and an abuse of that power ("judicial supremacy") is to chase 
after a will-o' -the-wisp. It leads inevitably into the morass of an unrealistic, 
mechanistic conception of judicial review; into the habit of characterizing 
this decision as "good law" and that one as "bad law," this decision as 
"soundly in line with precedent" and that one as "capricious," this deci• 
sion as being "in accordance with the intent of the framers" and that one 
as "judicial amendment of the Constitution in disguise," this decision as 
"in accord with the spirit of the Constitution" and that one as "a depar-
ture from sound constitutional principles," and so on. However appro-
priate such characterizations of the Court's rulings may be if one views 
the Court simply as the highest court of law in the land, they have little 
or no validity in connection with its performance of its greatest function, 
that of giving concrete form and substance to the cryptic authorizing and 
limiting clauses which outline our constitutional plan. In this area judicial 
pronouncements on close issues necessarily involve a high degree of exercise 
of will and choice rather than judgment, of applied political philosophy 
rather than legal expertise. If one accepts the principle of according the 
"awful" power to the Supreme Court to disallow national and state govern• 
mental actions on the ground that they conflict with immutable principles 
incorporated in the Constitution, one has committed himself to the prin• 
ciple of accepting as equally valid, at least until they can be altered by 
one means or another, the "bad" rulings of the Court as well as the "good." 
One must assume that the Justices who comprise the Court from time 
to time are equally sincere and devoted to the cause of maintaining un-
impaired the principles of the Constitution as they perceive them. As the 
author points out, Mr. Justice Peckham's enshrinement of laissez faire 
doctrine as a principle of constitutional law was an attempt to apply a 
kind of "preferred freedom doctrine of economic rights." (p. 119) Who can 
say his efforts to this end and those of his like-minded confreres on the 
bench were any more exercises in "judical supremacy" than those of Justices 
Black and Douglas later in advocating acceptance of a "preferred freedoms" 
doctrine in the area of civil liberties? Mr. Justice Peckham's unbounded 
confidence that "economic man," if allowed freedom from governmental 
restraints to pursue his material interests in the competition of the market 
place, would advance not only his own but the public interest to the maxi• 
mum was in time found through economic science to have been in some mea• 
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sure misplaced, and was eventually adjudged unworthy of being dignified as 
sound constitutional doctrine. In view of new knowledge now being un-
covered by social psychologists and other species of social scientists casting 
doubt on the validity of the theory that man is a ''rational animal" gov-
erned wholly by reason in his political and social behavior, who can say 
that the idea of complete reliance on untrammelled "competition in the 
market place of ideas" to reveal truth and induce its acceptance may not 
likewise be found to be properly subject to some measure of qualification 
also? 
In short, in accepting the principle of judicial review one must also be 
prepared to accept the fact that it simply means elevating the Court, for 
good or ill, to the position of a "power group" in the governmental process. 
As one must do in making a judgment on the propriety of the Senate's 
maintaining a system of rules of debate which permit a minority to prevent 
majority action, one must weigh the possibilities for what he deems good 
against the possibilities for what he deems evil in such a system and accept 
the consequences of his judgment. In political affairs there is no power 
that can be used only for "good" ends; and this includes the power of 
judicial review. 
To pursue this thought further, one may question the propriety of 
awarding to the Supreme Court the unqualified accolade given it in the 
subtitle: "Palladium of Freedom." It is true, of course, that in the last 
two or three decades the Supreme Court has made noteworthy contribu-
tions in advancing the cause of civil liberties, raising the standards of ad-
ministration of criminal justice, striking down the barriers of racial dis-
crimination, and enlightening the American people on the principles 
and ideals by which a truly democratic society must be guided. Its use of 
its power toward these ends has produced a remarkable reaction in popular 
attitudes toward the Court and toward the institution of judicial review. 
Many erstwhile critics have been converted into ardent defenders of this 
feature of our governmental system; many erstwhile defenders have been 
converted into critics. However, in this reviewer's opinion, to bestow this 
enconium upon the Court, without qualification, is to overlook several 
aspects of the matter. In the first place, the Court has chosen to emphasize 
its role of champion of civil rights and liberties only comparatively re-
cently. One may well ask, Where was the Supreme Court when those who 
perceived the incompatibility of slavery with free government were at-
tempting to restrict its spread and bring about its elimination? Where 
was the Court when the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, designed 
to insure equality under the law to the newly-emancipated Negro, were 
in effect rendered into dead letters for three-quarters of a century? 
Again, one may point out that such terms as "freedom" and "rights of 
minorities" are very tricky words indeed. As Lincoln pointed out in his 
story about the shepherd and the wolf, what is freedom for the one may 
well be regarded as an oppression by the other. One has only to call to 
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mind the violently opposed remarks and reactions to the recent events 
at Oxford, Mississippi, to remind himself of this fact. The term "minority" 
likewise is slippery in that it has relevance only within a particularly de-
fined context. The pro-segregationist white people of the state of Mississippi 
are a minority with reference to the people of the United States as a 
whole. The colored population of the state of Mississippi is a minority 
with reference to the state's white population. Which minority is the 
Court obligated to protect against the majority's will? So far as the Supreme 
Court's functioning as a protector of minorities is concerned, for that 
matter, its recent decision in Baker v. Carr3 will no doubt prove to have 
been a master stroke in protecting political freedom for urban majorities, 
as against their oppressors, the rural minorities. Judicial review can as 
well and properly be employed to protect the interests of a majority held 
in thrall by a minority as the other way around. It does not have to be 
confined in its use to protection of the underdog. It also has its uses in 
"legitimizing" majority rule and in vindicating authority to govern. 
These comments by way of criticism of Professor Mason's work are, 
concededly, somewhat on the cavilling side. He has presented a very 
closely-reasoned, compelling case for maintaining unimpaired our present 
system of judicial review and for an "activist-minded" Supreme Court 
where protection of minority rights and interests is concerned. He has 
made a distinct contribution to better understanding and appreciation of 
this feature of our governmental institutions. 
3 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
Joseph E. Kallenbach, 
Professor of Political Science, 
The University of Michigan 
